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INTRODUCTION
The Democratic Judge
Michael J. Gerhardt*
It is a special privilege for me to return to this great law school
to honor one of its greatest graduates. Each time I return to
Nashville, it feels like a homecoming. Each time I return, I also feel
that as I am getting older, Judge Merritt is getting younger. The last
time I was here, he got married; and the time before that, we squared
off for the umpteenth time on a tennis court. He also Writes more
opinions, gives more speeches, and has taken more of a leadership
role in protecting the interests of the federal judiciary than just about
any other judge. Meanwhile, a good source-Judge Richard
Arnold-informs me that Judge Merritt has taken up golf.
So, I hope you will appreciate my confessing that I do not re-
gard Judge Merritt's stepping aside as chief judge as a sign he is slow-
ing down. This is just the start of a new phase of his already distin-
guished career. For those who know him best, he will always be the
chief judge in our hearts and respect. He will always be the consum-
mate teacher, adviser, role model, friend, and doubles partner.
* Dean, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., Yale University 1978;
M.Sc., London School of Economics 1979; J.D., University of Chicago 1982. I am grateful to
Deborah Schwartz for her helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Christie Smith and Halle
Ludson for their excellent research assistance.
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Even for those who know Judge Merritt best, however, it might
seem a bit odd to honor him with a symposium on defining democracy
for the next century. When we think of democracy most of us tend to
think only about the political activity in Washington. If we think of
the judiciary at all, most of us tend to think only of the Supreme
Court.
It is easy to miss that the real test of democracy is not in
Washington. The real test is in places like Nashville or Mobile,
Alabama, where I grew up. When I was growing up, school prayer
was flourishing, even though the Supreme Court had much earlier
struck down public school prayer.' Nor did it matter that the
Supreme Court had struck down state-mandated segregated schools
in 1954.2 The public schools were still largely segregated when I
graduated in 1974. If you want to know how democracy works, you
have to look outside of Washington.
Tennessee is an especially good place to look. Here the
nation's movement away from republicanism and toward democracy
began. Judge Merritt knows that history well. Through his classical
legal training under the watchful eye of Dean John Wade, and
through his experiences as a first-rate lawyer, prosecutor, educator,
and judge, he has developed a keen appreciation of what makes our
constitutional democracy exceptional. His vision of democracy has not
been a political scientist's ideal, but rather the legal ideal specified by
the Constitution. He has always appreciated that judicial power has
limits and that our constitutional democracy is lost if its citizens, who
are the ultimate sovereigns, are unwilling or unable to rise to the
challenge of governing themselves. He has appreciated, like Justice
Robert Jackson before him, that "[clivil liberties had their origin and
must find their ultimate guaranty in the faith of the people. If that
faith should be lost, [no one] in Washington could... supply its
want."3 Judge Merritt has understood that federal judges cannot
make all of the hard decisions for the citizenry; they can ask the
people to rule but they cannot make them rule. Federal judges can
expose injustice, but they cannot make people just. Federal judges
can lead by example or instruction, but they cannot make an
unwilling or cynical citizenry follow. Federal judges cannot energize
democracy single-handedly, but they can, by judiciously deferring to
it, avoid unnecessarily sapping its energy.
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 182 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Judge Merritt has also understood that the very idea of judicial
review has its origins in the democratic acceptance of the
Constitution. He has understood that a written constitution without
federal judges to enforce its limitations is either anarchy or crude
majority rule. The latter is fine as long as one is not a member of an
unpopular minority or does not express unpopular ideas. The prob-
lem is, as James Madison observed, that "[a] dependence on the peo-
ple.., is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions."4 One such safeguard is judicial review.
It is tempting to think of judicial review and respect for demo-
cratic values as being at odds with each other. Such thinking has its
origins in the discontent triggered by the Warren Court's activism. In
1962, Alexander Bickel captured this discontent when he coined the
phrase "countermajoritarian difficulty"5 to refer to unprincipled
judicial interference with legitimate majoritarian decisionmaking.
Ironically, Professor Bickel's argument overshadowed the publication
just two years before of a book by his Yale Law School colleague,
Charles Black, arguing that this dilemma was illusory. For Professor
Black, judicial review
must be and can be justified not as a means of defeating but as a means of ful-
filling the will of the people. It is a means-the chief means at hand-for mak-
ing real in the world the idea of the limitation of the power of the State itself
(and hence, in a democracy, the power of the people) by law. But the noble
paradox is that the State itself must set up this limit on itself, and submit to
the organ of its enforcement.6
Subsequently, scholars have tended to agree with Professor
Bickel that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" poses the central
dilemma of constitutional law. The most tempting solution has been
the development of so-called "grand" theories of constitutional law
designed to ground all constitutional interpretation in a single unify-
ing concept. These theories have often been thought to be the salva-
tion of constitutional law because they might, if adopted by federal
judges, provide clear principles that could restrain or justify judicial
interference with democratic decisions.
4. John L. Hines, Jr., Forum: The Confirmation Hearings, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 833, 834.
5. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 16 (Yale U., 2d ed. 1986).
6. Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court. Judicial Review in a Democracy 223-
24 (MacMillan, 1960).
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Yet, the movement toward "grand" constitutional theories has
largely failed. One reason is that no such theory can explain constitu-
tional law fully or be applied consistently. Such theories also have
failed because of judges like Gil Merritt. He has appreciated as well
as any judge the debates generated by and about such theories. He
has, like Richard Arnold and Frank Coffin, to name but a couple of
other equally distinguished judges, resisted the temptation to indulge
in such theorizing or attempt in one fell swoop to solve the mysteries
of constitutional law. He has understood that judging is not the
forum for measuring the viability of a constitutional theory.
Judge Merritt has followed a different path. He has been a
distinguished devotee of what Karl Llewellyn called the grand tradi-
tion of common law judging, of deciding cases incrementally, one at a
time.7 I think Judge Merritt would agree with former dean, now
Judge Guido Calabresi, who said,
I feel more comfortable approaching a topic like this in common law fashion,
trying to build up from cases, hypothetical and real, than by working down
from great principles. I would rather approach the issues from a specific field
of law-itself affected by other fields of law as well as by its own peculiar prob-
lems and questions-and see where that leads us, than to try to deal with the
topic as if I--or anyone-knew all law and was ready to describe it in terms of
an abstract theory.
8
The great common law judges do not regard defining democracy for
the general public or the other branches as their task. Common law
judging is compatible with our form of democracy because it confines
the scope of judicial comment and does not try to preempt democratic
forces from sorting through competing conceptions of democracy. 9
The absence of a coherent general theory of judicial review in
Judge Merritt's decisions is the mark of a good judge. His opinions
reflect that the process of adjudication differs from the process of
legislation 'O or the process of academic theorizing. Judges have sub-
7. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals v (Little, Brown,
1960).
8. Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a
Public Law Problem xv (Syracuse U., 1985).
9. As Professor Phil Frickey has noted, "the very process of adjudication makes the
judicial creation or adoption of Big Theory next to impossible except in interstitial or bitesize
pieces." Philip P. Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The Judicial Artist as Scholar
and Pragmatist, 60 Tulane L. Rev. 276, 312 (1985).
10. I feel certain Judge Merritt would agree with his friend and fellow circuit judge,
Richard Arnold, on this score. As Judge Arnold has observed:
[J]udges make law in a number of senses, but we do not do it, or at least we ought not to
do it, in the same sense that Congress makes law. We do not do it simply because we
think a certain rule of law is a good thing, although that may be one of the ingredients
[Vol. 50:277
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stantial freedom of decisional choice, but they are restrained by insti-
tutional values, such as democratically managed jurisdiction or the
need for consensus on a collegial court.
Of equal importance, Judge Merritt has understood that the
freedom enjoyed by life-tenured judges imposes on them a special
responsibility akin to that of the liberty enjoyed by each citizen. Life
tenure, like citizenship, imposes great responsibility on those privi-
leged to bear it. Freedom belongs to those who use it wisely. Judges
are role models to those who wield power in a democracy. In this
sense, judges are like teachers. Judge Merritt drew just such an
analogy recently:
Like judges, teachers should not punish or reward people on the basis of
inadmissible factors-race, religion, gender, political ideology-but teachers,
like judges, must daily decide which arguments are relevant, which
computations are correct, which analogies are good or bad, and when it is time
to stop writing or talking.11
Judicial deference is essential for maintaining the credibility of judi-
cial restraint and for nurturing the confidence of democratic deci-
sionmakers. Judicial review is essential for vindicating liberties that
would cease to exist in its absence. If there is a tension between these
functions, it is one embedded within the idea of constitutional democ-
racy; it is not one federal judges are obliged to resolve.
Federal judges are obliged, however, to decide cases and to
ensure the efficiency, viability, and fairness of the court system.
Judge Merritt has done this. For example, his exemplary perform-
ances as both the Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit and head of the
Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
illustrate his profound respect for democratic values and institutions.
He has been the model of the truly collegial judge, and, as chief judge,
he tirelessly strove to smooth court operations, to make sure every
judge was treated fairly, to forge coalitions, to build bridges, and to
reduce friction whenever possible. His legacy as chief judge is one of
that you think about when you are making law in the narrow sense in which you are
permitted to do so. Even Judge Cardozo in his lectures about the sociological method of
jurisprudence-that is to say, that judges ought to take into account their notions, or
somebody's notions, of social welfare, when they make decisions-even he stresses that
judges make law only interstitially. They legislate, if you can call it that, only in the
gaps. They fill the open spaces in the law.
Richard S. Arnold, From the Bench. Judges and the Public, 9 Litigation 5, 58 (Summer 1983).
11. Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995).
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trust, collegiality, fairness, candor, and respectful and reasonable
discourse.
As head of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Judge Merritt sent shock waves through the
media and the judiciary by openly discussing judicial operations. He
took inspiration from the First Amendment for the sake of promoting
greater judicial accountability and informing the public about the
judiciary. He knew that if the judiciary did not speak up for its own
interests, no one would. He won quick and notable praise for these
efforts. When first told about Judge Merritt's candor about the
Judicial Conference's Executive Committee meetings, former Chief
Judge and White House Counsel Abner Mikva said, "Surprise is not
the right word. I was delighted."12 Defending Judge Merritt's un-
precedented approach, Judge Mikva said, "He's a modernist. He gave
up using quill pens long ago." 1 Judge Merritt himself explained, "On
any issue where the public interest is at stake, I think judges want to
hear from people who have a view, not just irrational stuff, but a real
considered opinion about it."14
Judge Merritt went where no federal judge had gone
before-before the media and the public. In one forum, he defended
life tenure for federal judges: "It was the Founding Fathers' intention
that the judiciary should be a branch not dependent on taking a poll.
It is the duty of the judiciary to maintain the liberties of the minority
even if they are not popular."5 In local fora, he has denounced the
dangers popular election poses to judicial independence, 6 approved of
"strong public criticism of judges," but condemned "mean-spirited
personal attacks on our characters and vehement attacks on the
judiciary as an institution.""
On behalf of the federal judiciary, Judge Merritt undertook
actions that spoke louder than words, though one should understand
that a judge's words often constitute his or her actions. He defended
the jury system and judicial independence, pioneered the use of an
electronic citation system in his circuit, advocated the use of cameras
12. Eva Rodriguez and Robert Schmidt, Judicial Conference Tries a Little Uncharacteristic
Openness; From Cameras to Protective Orders to Itself, Legal Times 1 (Mar. 20, 1995).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Julie Cohen, Term Limits for Judges?, Legal Times 6 (Aug. 21, 1995).
16. See Catherine Trevison, Should Public Opinion Tip the Balance of Justice?,
Tennessean D1 (Oct. 20, 1996) (quoting Judge Merritt, who stated that popular election would
lead to "complete bastardization of the law").
17. Andy Sher, Crime Fears, Death Penalty Debate Stirring Furor Over Judge Election,
Nashville Banner Al (July 22, 1996) (quoting Judge Merritt).
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in the courtroom, pleaded for the depoliticization of judicial confirma-
tions, testified against congressional jurisdiction-stripping efforts, and
opposed any legislative activity that could harm or weaken the federal
judiciary. For instance, at the start of 1996, he stood alone in
denouncing Congress for failing to fund the federal judiciary fully.18
This failure threatened federal judicial operations, and he boldly
called attention to its consequences through every available means,
including threatening a lawsuit to force compliance with the
fundamental obligations of Article III. It probably was no coincidence
that shortly after he made this threat Congress passed an emergency
bill to fund the federal courts.
Later in the same year he again publicly chastised Congress,
this time for passing the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996. He testified that
under this law "the balance would be tilted dangerously toward
executive dominance and control over the judiciary if the president
had line-item veto authority over the judicia[ry]." 19 When Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan called to thank me for testifying against the
same act, he suggested that I must have felt very lonely with only
Professor Larry Tribe and Chief Judge Merritt joining me. I
answered that two law professors could not have asked for better
company.
Judge Merritt has shown his respect for democratic values in a
second major way. He has acknowledged the needs for judicial re-
straint and for the judiciary to restrain itself. This might surprise
those eager to dismiss Judge Merritt as just another liberal judge.
Rather, he has taken the lead in helping to shatter the stereotype of
Democratic judges. For instance, in explaining the basis for an en
banc court's rejection of a district court's consent decree augmenting
state parole procedures, he noted that the danger of ruling otherwise
was that
federal courts would take over from state administrators and courts the inter-
pretation and enforcement of a whole host of local procedural rules governing
such local matters as zoning, probate, licensing, school discipline or public
health, and states would be discouraged from laying down reasonable and use-
18. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Judge Says Budget Impasse Could Shut Nation's Courts,
N.Y. Times A5 (Dec. 23, 1995).
19. John Flynn Rooney, Federal Judiciary Should Be Exempt from Line-Item Veto,
Congress Told, Chi. Daily L. Bull. 1 (Jan. 13, 1995).
1997] 283
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ful rules to govern the conduct of their own affairs for fear that those rules
would subject them to jurisdiction and penalties in federal courts.20
In a separation of powers case,21 Judge Merritt defended coop'-
eration between federal prosecutors and the House of Representatives
in sharing information relevant to the initiation of a judicial
impeachment proceeding. Judge Merritt suggested:
The framers did not contemplate that the branches would communicate by
smoke signals from distant mountain tops. Rather, a number of functions
were mixed between the legislative and the executive, e.g., the war power, the
treaty power, the appointive power, the budgetary process, the spending
power. In all of these areas of government, the two branches check each other
and there must be cooperation if government is to function. 22
His decision supported democratic institutions at the same time it
acknowledged the constitutional vulnerability of federal judges to
them.
Judicial deference is not, however, the same thing as refusing
to decide cases or abdicating all responsibility to political forces. In
spite of his sensitivity to the need for judicial restraint, Judge Merritt
has fiercely remained committed to the even-handed dispensation of
justice. As the late J. Skelly Wright observed,
It is claimed that judicial review is anomalously undemocratic, and if by that
one means that it is often counter-majoritarian, the point must be conceded.
But in another sense, the courts are the most democratic institutions we
have....
It is in the nature of courts that they cannot close their doors to
individuals seeking justice....
.... The judiciary is thus the only branch of government which can truly
be said to have adopted Dr. Seuss' gentle maxim: "A person's a person, no
matter how small."23
Every day for twenty years, Judge Merritt has put this maxim into
practice. He has done this in the same way as his friend, Judge
Arnold, who described the time for judicial action as follows:
After you are convinced that you have jurisdiction, after you have given to the
state courts and to the other branches of government the deference and respect
that is their due, after you have satisfied yourself that you really are, if there
20. Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1165 (6th Cir. 1994).
21. In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1987)
(Merritt, J., sitting by designation).
22. Id. at 1444.
23. J. Skelly Wright, No Matter How Small, 2 Hum. Rts. 115, 116-18 (1972) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who, passim (1954)).
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is a statute involved, enforcing the will of the legislature, after all of those
hurdles have been gotten over, then the greatest error that a judge can make is
to pull your punches because you fear that the majority of your neighbors are
not going to like what you decide.
24
Judge Merritt has never pulled his punches. I imagine that
this is not news to anyone who knows him. When the time for action
has come, he has had the courage of his convictions. When the time
for action has come, he has never hesitated to do what is necessary to
vindicate a superior principle of law. In a wide range of cases, he has
supported vindicating numerous individual liberties, including a
woman's right to choose,25 the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures, 26 the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antees of the right of confrontation and against ineffective assistance
of counsel, 27 the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protec-
tion,28 and the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, 29
free exercise of religion,30 and prohibition of the establishment of
religion.31
I will discuss only a few cases to illustrate the broader point
that no matter how small the person, no matter how unpopular the
cause, Judge Merritt has democratically dispensed justice. For in-
stance, like another great Southern jurist who had been a prosecutor
before he took to the federal bench, Hugo Black, 32 Judge Merritt has
24. Arnold, 9 Litigation at 59 (cited in note 10).
25. See, for example, Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 822
F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1987); Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984).
26. See, for example, Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), affd as
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See also Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119,
1137 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
27. See, for example, Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575 (6th Cir. 1992); Lyle v. Koehler, 720
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983).
28. See, for example, Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1168 (6th Cir. 1994)
(Merritt, C.J., concurring); Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council v.
McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Rural West Tennessee African-American
Affairs Council v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
29. Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987).
30. See Thompson v. Kentucky, 712 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983).
31. See, for example, Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.
1987).
32. Judge Merritt clearly would agree with Justice Black, who said:
Under our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of
refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak,
outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and human
excitement. Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no
such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death. No
higher duty, no more solemn responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of
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invariably insisted that federal prosecutors respect the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. Surely, there are no more unpopular
litigants than criminal defendants, especially those seeking reversals
of convictions for heinous crimes. Yet, in urging a new trial for a
criminal defendant sentenced to death, Judge Merritt explained:
It is not the fimction of the federal courts to kowtow to the political
passions of the day that decree that we supply only a swift execution without
regard to whether the accused is guilty or received a fair trial. In the judicial
arena, there is no traditional social value or constitutional principle requiring
rapid execution or extinction of human life....
It is our job to make sure that the traditional principles of federalism are
honored. It is our job to see that a life is not taken in the absence of a fair trial
in which the constitutional rights granted to the accused are observed.... The
process of deliberation, reflection, trial, review and the elimination of error and
uncertainty takes time, including the time it takes to review new evidence
when it becomes necessary. The traditional deliberative process must be fully
complied with in order to insure that innocent life and the attributes of human
dignity are preserved in the face of the biological passion and hostility in our
species that lead us to kill each other without reason. 33
United States v. Lanier,34 in spite of the controversy it has
generated, is just the most recent in a long line of Judge Merritt's
decisions checking prosecutorial abuse of discretion. The issue in the
case, now pending before the Supreme Court, was whether a state
judge who had sexually harassed and assaulted judicial employees
could be criminally prosecuted under a federal civil rights statute for
"the willful 'deprivation of any rights... protected by the
Constitution.' 35 The critical question was not whether Judge Lanier
had engaged in serious misconduct. He had clearly done so. The
critical question was whether his acts fit within the scope of federal
criminal liability.
Writing for an en banc majority, Judge Merritt answered the
question "no." Initially, he found the statute not to have been drafted
with sufficient precision to give proper notice to every citizen of its
coverage to misconduct of the sort done by Judge Lanier.36 He also
translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield deliberately
planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our
Constitution-of whatever race, creed, or persuasion.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
33. O'Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409, 1413 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (Merritt, C.J., concurring).
34. 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996).
35. Id. at 1382 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994 ed.)).
36. He explained:
[Allthough members of Congress may have realized that in passing a large recodification
of the existing body of federal law they might unwittingly be changing something, they
had no actual knowledge that they were expanding criminal liability to cover violations
286 [Vol. 50:277
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stressed the duty of federal judges not to correct Congress's mistakes
by reading things into statutes that were not there. He explained,
"[a]llowing the defendant who is guilty of reprehensible conduct to go
free is not a satisfying result, but it is the result required by long-
standing principles of federalism, separation of judicial and legislative
powers and the right to formal public notice when new crimes are
enacted."37
Judge Merritt's position in Lanier is like many he has taken to
check official abuse of power. As early as his first year as a judge, he
reversed a district court's denial of a motion to suppress from a de-
fendant linked to organized crime. Surely, this ruling gave the former
prosecutor, then judge, no pleasure. Yet, he held that federal officials
lacked authority to break into an office to install wiretaps. He wrote:
We believe, therefore, that federal judicial officers do not possess inherent
power to issue search warrants or inherent power in the absence of statute to
authorize law enforcement officers to engage in break-ins in the execution of
search warrants. Any such power, according to Lord Camden's interpretation
of the common law and Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the
Constitution "must be given by the written law." Our understanding of the
development of the common law and the Fourth Amendment and our
understanding of the nature of federal law as settled in the early days of the
Republic lead us to this conclusion.38
Similarly, Judge Merritt has consistently questioned the le-
gitimacy of the Sentencing Commission's authority to direct the impo-
sition of incremental penalties for unconvicted "relevant conduct." As
he has said:
I do not understand why my sisters and brothers, usually the voices of sweet
reason and deference to the majoritarian branch of government, persist in fol-
lowing the Sentencing Commission and the Department of Justice in their de-
fiance of the policy stated expressly in the statute we are interpreting. I un-
derstand ... why the Sentencing Commission and the Department of Justice
might believe it is in their interest to control the sentencing process. It is
certainly in their bureaucratic interest to do so. Congressional appropriations
and governmental power depend upon it. But it is not in anyone else's interest
to adopt a policy contrary to the one expressed by Congress. It is certainly not
in the interest of the judiciary as the "least dangerous branch," and not in the
of rights beyond certain enumerated rights, primarily those of contract, property, and
equal protection.
Id. at 1387.
37. Id. at 1394 n.13.
38. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 844 (6th Cir. 1978).
19971 287
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interest of individuals in society who may be wrongly accused by prosecutors
whose power has now been so enlarged through our default.39
Judge Merritt has also sided with unpopular speakers. For
him, nothing is more sacred in our constitutional democracy than
freedom of speech. This freedom belongs to every American. Nor is
any governmental institution immune from having to comply with the
First Amendment. Thus, in setting aside a gag order, Judge Merritt
explained that "[tjhe courts are public institutions funded with public
revenues for the purpose of resolving public disputes, and the right of
publicity concerning their operations goes to the heart of their
function under our system of civil liberty. 4
Ironically, perhaps no area of law is more divisive than judicial
enforcement of the constitutional guarantee of equality. It is here
Judge Merritt's pragmatism and incrementalism probably have been
most frustrating, because he has tended to resist extremism. His
concerns have been with fairness, the need to abolish state-mandated
or -generated discrimination, and the limits of judicial supremacy.
Thus, he dissented in a fair housing case 41 because
federal court[s] ... should not get into the business of trying to change or
improve [their] own or anyone else's image... by ordering the publication of a
favorable publicity in the press. We are not equipped to change the public's
perception of a city by judicial order. Not only does it seem to me a futile
exercise; I am unable to square such an order by a federal court with the first
amendment.
42
He explained:
The freedom that exists in this country to state beliefs different from those of
the prevailing majority gave birth to the civil rights movement. That move-
ment cannot last long if, in the name of equality, it undermines the conditions
39. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1523 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, J., dissent-
ing).
40. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987). Similarly, he recognized the
importance of applying the First Amendment in the public school setting. Consequently, in a
dissent, he defended the right of a public school student to criticize the administration of his
school in his campaign speech as a candidate for student body president. As Judge Merritt
explained:
[T]he speech cannot be classified as one which "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." If the school administration can
silence a student criticizing it for being narrow minded and authoritarian, how can
students engage in political dialogue with their educators about their education?
Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 1989) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
41. United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 580 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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of liberty which sustain it by requiring others to publish statements agreeing
with its position.
43
In the final analysis, the quality of a judge is not measured by
his notable rulings. As Judge Gerhard Gesell noted:
The Third Branch has, in many ways, the most delicate role in our
constitutional scheme. Whether judges like it or not, few judges will be long
remembered. Decisions become outdated. Indeed, even the names of many
truly outstanding judges have long since been forgotten. In a larger sense,
what may count in the long run is whether or not a judge during his [or her]
career has strengthened or weakened the fragile institution we call the
Judiciary.
44
If this be the test, then Judge Merritt has met it. He has written his
share of landmark opinions, such as Garner45 or Procter & Gamble.46
But he has done more than that. As the consummate craftsman, he
has scrupulously disclosed in each of his opinions the thought proc-
esses of an intelligent judge at work-considering all sides of an issue,
weighing the arguments frankly, and defending his conclusions in a
reasoned manner. But he has done more than that. He has improved
federal judicial performance through his behavior toward his col-
leagues and his dedicated efforts to ensure that the Sixth Circuit's
work was done efficiently and fairly, every voice was heard, and the
public was informed about basic judicial actions. The future of the
federal judiciary rests not with the dominance of a single judge or a
coterie of judges, but rather with steady judicial performance that
secures society's acceptance of the incalculable value of an independ-
ent federal judiciary.
I am sure if he were here no one would be prouder of Judge
Merritt's record than his mentor, friend, and former colleague, the
late John Wade. No one would be prouder than Dean Wade of the
judge's refusal to preach or theorize. No one would be prouder of his
dedication to do the often dirty work of judging with grace, precision,
learning, and humor. No one would be prouder of the journey Gil
43. Id. at 581 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
44. Gerhard A. Gesell, In Memoriam: Judge J. Skelly Wright, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1029,
1034 (1989).
45. Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), affd as Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
46. Proctor & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Merritt has made from Tennessee Democrat to truly distinguished
democratic judge. Since we gather today in the house Dean Wade
built, I cannot imagine any greater nor more meaningful praise than
that.
